This paper justifies unequal health care quality in a model with two regions and patients differentiated by location and quality perception. Efficient distribution with unequal healthcare quality arises when there are low travel and/or quality provision costs. If costs are sufficiently low, then both regions win from inequality. Lump-sum transfers and price regulatory policies restore an efficient solution.
Introduction
Globalisation, diminishing transport costs, and cross-border barrier reduction caused patient mobility expansion. The main incentive is the difference in the perceived quality of medical treatments. Ehrbeck et al. (2008) studied interviews with 49,980 patients who traveled abroad for medical treatment. They found that the vast majority of them sought quality and only 13% of the patients were motivated by lower-cost care for medically necessary and discretionary procedures. The main flow is from developing countries to developed countries.
The same phenomenon is observed in interregional movements. In 2009, 168,000 patients from southern Italy chose to be treated in the north and only 31,000 patients did the opposite, choosing to be hospitalised in a southern region despite their northern residence (Toth, 2014) .
When there are large interregional differences in health care quality, patients often spend time and money for travel to find better medical treatment. Brekke et al. (2014) were motivated to study the effects of patient mobility on health care quality and welfare by new legislation in the European Union. The main results of this paper are based on the assumption of different costs of quality provision in two regions. Quality provision costs include costs on skilled doctors, medical facilities, and technologies, among other variables. These resources are traded on the common market with common prices. Looking at European countries and interregional studies, it is natural to assume that these costs are equal.
Under the Hotelling framework, unequal qualities in efficient distribution arise from the non-uniform density of a population (Aiura, 2013) , unequal costs of quality provision (Brekke et al., 2014) , and unequal production costs (Herr, 2011; Beitia, 2003) . These reasons may not be the main cause of quality asymmetry and patient mobility within countries or across developed EU member states. The aim of this paper is to show that quality asymmetry arises even in countries and regions with equal productivity and uniform density.
Hospitals are faced with a highly heterogeneous set of patients. Some of these patients have mild diseases, while others have more serious diseases. The natural assumption is that the former have little concern regarding quality, and the latter fuss over the quality. Inequality in health leads to inequality in quality perception. All patients are differentiated by quality perception (marginal utility of quality), from indifferent to highly concerned about health care quality. This paper shows that a large variance in quality level is efficient in a world with low travel and/or quality provision costs. Equal quality becomes efficient when there are high costs.
Market competition fails in effective solution implementation. Simple price regulation leads to an effective solution. This paper contributes to the two strands of the literature: health care market regulation and price-quality competition. Health care market failure and price regulation have been surveyed by Dranove (2012) . The regulation of the health care market with horizontal and vertical differentiation was analysed by Bardey et al. (2012) , Beitia (2003) , Brekke et al. (2006) , Brekke et al. (2011), and Herr (2011) . Models with simultaneous price and quality choice were developed by , Chioveanu (2012) , and Dubovik and Janssen (2012) . This paper, unlike other papers, models the differentiation of consumers (patients) by quality perception.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Equilibrium of the price-quality competition is derived in Section 3. Section 4 characterises price regulation.
Section 5 provides concluding remarks. All proofs are given in the Appendix
Model
Two health care providers (hospitals) are located at the extremes of a   In addition to different locations, hospitals also have potentially different health care quality. The health care quality of Hospital 1 is denoted by 1 q and that of Hospital 2 by 2 q . Different consumers value quality differently according to their own quality perception y .
Quality perception y is uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1] for each location point. The location and quality perception distributions are independent. The consumer with location x and quality perception y has the following utility function  , and marginal treatment costs are normalised to zero. This cost structure stresses the importance of quality provision costs, which seems reasonable for the hospital market (Brekke et al., 2007) .
The first best (centralised) solution
Utilitarian social welfare is the difference between consumer surplus and the costs of quality provision. The social planner could create a partition of location/quality perception square in any manner. Optimal social welfare is
s.t. 
The proof for Theorem 1 and subsequent theorem are given in the Appendix. The second part of Theorem 1 confirms the results of Brekke et al. (2014) for equal quality provision costs.
In the presence of high transportation costs and/or high quality production costs, all consumers from Region 1 utilise services from Hospital 1, and the same applies for Region 2. Patients do not have incentives to travel across jurisdictions. Lower costs change the situation. A transitional case is depicted in Fig. 1 . In this case, asymmetrical quality provision becomes efficient. One hospital specialises in high quality service, while another hospital is much smaller and specialised in low quality service. Patients from a low quality hospital region split between the two hospitals. In each location of this region, patients with low quality perception utilise the services of their own hospital, but patients with high quality perception (with more serious diseases) travelled to another hospital. Unequal quality solution leads to quality specialization. In the case of health care provision one hospital (low quality) works basically with mild diseases. It serves the minority of their own region's patients. Another hospital is much larger and serves patients with serious diseases who require high quality. This hospital serves all patients from their own region and patients with serious diseases from another region.
No patient mobility across jurisdictions
Without mobility across jurisdictions each region has their own social welfare
which reaches the highest value at The first part of Theorem 2 provides strong support for patient mobility and quality specialisation. The region with higher quality in the first best solution is superior because it is served by a higher quality health care producer and the quality provision costs are shared. The region with lower quality is superior because it is served by the higher quality health care producer, while there is only a modest increase in the quality provision costs. In the second case, the low quality region gains are limited and the low quality region would not approve a centralised solution if it had some effect on decision-making.
Market provision
Under market provision, health care providers simultaneously choose prices and qualities. Hospitals use simple linear pricing and seek to maximise their own profit.
where   The indifference locus in location and quality perception space separates Hospitals' . In area A, with high quality and low prices, Hospital 1 is a monopolist. In area B, the hospital loses some low quality perception consumers. In area I, Hospital 1 has zero demand. There is symmetry between parameter areas. Hospital i's area A corresponds with Hospital j's area I. Other correspondences are as follows: B and H, C and G, D and F, E and E.
The demand function depends only on the difference between prices and the difference between qualities and
In the interior equilibrium 0
, the following condition holds
Because of Eq. (18-21) and 
There is positive price/quality relationship. This is common in price/quality competition.
In all efficient distribution, point   
Price regulation
Price and quality competition is inefficient. Efficiency can be restored by lump-sum transfers and price regulatory policies. Under this policy, all patients pay the same amount  . It can be tax or a social insurance contribution. Government pays 
Facing this demand, hospitals maximize their profits 
then in equilibrium 
Concluding remarks
There are two efficient regimes of health care quality provision. In the presence of high travel and quality provision costs, qualities should be equal. Reducing these costs results in an unequal distribution of quality in an effective solution. High health care inequality under a centralised solution is better for the majority of the population as well as for both regions, if the costs are sufficiently low. As long as utility is linear in income it does not depend on difference on income levels in two regions. Market equilibrium implements an efficient solution only when there are high travel and quality provision costs. Lump-sum transfers and price regulatory policies restore efficiency in the case of low costs.
Unequal health care quality provision can be observed in Italy, where the already significant gap between the health care systems of the northern and southern regions has increased within a decade (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (Toth, 2014) . It is reasonable to suggest that transport and quality provision costs declined during this decade and therefore increased unequal health care quality provision is efficient. 
is a non-increasing function (mapping). The first order condition for this problem is
and in some cases there is an interval with 1 ) (
and consider three cases. 
Social welfare in this case is higher than in the first and the second cases if and only if 
The root of Eq. (46) belongs to the interval (51). Because of
Proof of Theorem 2.
Without loss of generality in the centralised solution with interregional patient mobility 
where
. Under a decentralised solution each region has 8 32
Proof of Theorem 3.
The only symmetric equilibrium can be in area E (hereinafter in the proofs numbering from 
 is greater than 
Because of t p  
